aquasecurity / trivy↗

10 GitHub repos every cloud security expert needs to know: 1. ScoutSuite: multi-cloud security auditing for AWS, Azure, and GCP. github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSui… 2. Trivy: scans container images, Git repos, and cloud configs for vulnerabilities. github.com/aquasecurity/triv… 3. OPA: the standard policy engine for Kubernetes, Terraform, and APIs. github.com/open-policy-agent… 4. Prowler: 300+ security checks covering CIS, GDPR, HIPAA, and SOC2 across major clouds. github.com/prowler-cloud/pro… 5. Checkov: scans Terraform, CloudFormation, and Dockerfiles for security issues before production. github.com/bridgecrewio/chec… 6. Cloudsplaining: exposes AWS IAM least privilege violations fast. IAM misconfig is the number one cloud breach vector. github.com/salesforce/clouds… 7. Stratus Red Team: cloud adversary emulation mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for purple team exercises. github.com/DataDog/stratus-r… 8. Pacu: AWS exploitation framework for cloud pentests. The Metasploit of AWS. github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs… 9. Gitleaks: catches secrets, API keys, and credentials leaked into Git repos. github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks 10. AWS Security Tools Arsenal: curated index of every open-source AWS security tool you need. github.com/toniblyx/my-arsen… Star these repos. The cloud security professionals who know these tools are the ones getting hired. For more on AI and cybersecurity opportunities, subscribe to my YouTube channel: invidious.tiekoetter.com/@victorakinode

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On March 19, 2026, TEAM PCP @pcpcats successfully compromised Aqua Security’s Trivy vulnerability scanner. They force-pushed malicious code to 76 of 77 version tags in the aquasecurity/trivy-action repository. Any CI/CD pipeline using these tags automatically pulled a Cloud Stealer that scraped memory (/proc/*/mem), harvested AWS/GCP/Azure metadata, and bundled secrets into an encrypted file The malware executed the legitimate Trivy scan after stealing credentials, meaning pipelines still showed a Green/Pass status while being drained of secrets. Impacted Organizations While over 1,000 SaaS environments and 10,000+ workflows are estimated to be affected, two major entities have been the focus of recent reports: EU Commission (Confirmed): CERT-EU confirmed a breach of the Commission’s AWS-based Europa platform Scope: Approximately 91.7 GB of compressed data (340 GB uncompressed) was exfiltrated. This included 52,000 email-related files and impacted 29 other EU agencies.+1 Status: Detection occurred on March 24; the data was reportedly leaked by ShinyHunters on March 28 after extortion failed. Cisco The Claim: Threat intelligence reports (specifically from Black Kite and others) indicate that a development environment linked to Trivy led to the theft of Cisco source code. Cisco has remained notably quiet compared to the EU Commission’s transparency. While their Talos team is actively monitoring the threat actor group, a formal public Statement of Impact regarding the specific Trivy-linked source code theft has not been released as of April 6 TeamPCP and their affiliates (including the Vect ransomware group) set deadlines for organizations to negotiate before their harvested credentials and stolen data are sold or leaked Since the deadline has passed, security researchers expect a surge in secondary attacks. Threat actors are now likely using the stolen AWS/Azure keys to move laterally into production environments of the 1,000+ affected orgs If you are managing environments that use Trivy, the window for preventative action has closed You are now in Incident Response mode Godspeed brothers

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Trivy GitHub Action Hijacked to Steal CI/CD Secrets Across Thousands of Pipelines In a targeted supply chain attack, threat actors compromised two official GitHub Actions used by the Trivy vulnerability scanner, turning trusted version tags into a stealthy infostealer distribution channel. The attackers force-pushed malicious commits to 75 out of 76 version tags in the [aquasecurity/trivy-action] repository and seven tags in [aquasecurity/setup-trivy]. This breach served as the entry point for a broader campaign that would later cascade into the compromise of LiteLLM packages, npm ecosystems, and a self-propagating worm. 🎯 The Initial Attack The adversary didn't exploit a vulnerability in Git or GitHub. They had valid credentials with sufficient privileges to push code and rewrite existing tags. Using those credentials, they force-pushed malicious commits to version tags without creating new releases or pushing to standard branches. → 75 tags in aquasecurity/trivy-action were poisoned. → 7 tags in aquasecurity/setup-trivy were also modified. → Trusted version references became distribution channels for malware. TeamPCP Cloud Stealer The payload executes within GitHub Actions runners and targets sensitive data in CI/CD environments: SSH keys, Cloud service provider credentials, Database connection strings, Git and Docker configurations, Kubernetes tokens, Cryptocurrency wallets. ⚠️ The Three-Stage Stealer: → Harvest: Scrapes environment variables from runner process memory and the file system. → Encrypt: Packages stolen data into an encrypted archive. → Exfiltrate: Sends the archive to an attacker-controlled server at scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org. The source code self-identifies as TeamPCP Cloud stealer. 🔁 The Cascading Impact This Trivy compromise was the seed. Stolen credentials from CI/CD environments enabled the attackers to: → Backdoor LiteLLM packages on PyPI. → Compromise multiple npm packages with a self-propagating worm. → Harvest credentials from downstream environments, expanding their reach. The loop that followed: Trivy compromised, credentials stolen, those credentials used to compromise LiteLLM and npm packages, which in turn harvested more credentials, traces back to this initial breach. 🛡️ What to Do Now If you used aquasecurity/trivy-action or aquasecurity/setup-trivy during the compromise window: → Rotate all secrets present in your CI/CD environment immediately. Assume everything is compromised. → Block exfiltration domain scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org and IP 45.148.10[.]212 at the network level. → Check GitHub accounts for repositories named tpcp-docs. This may indicate successful exfiltration via a fallback mechanism. 🛡️Long-Term Hardening → Pin GitHub Actions to full SHA hashes, not version tags. Version tags can be moved to point at malicious commits, as demonstrated in this attack. → Audit CI/CD credentials and enforce least privilege. → Monitor for unusual tag modifications in your repositories. Trivy, a tool designed to secure the software supply chain, became the entry point for compromising it. The attacker didn't need to break into GitHub. They used legitimate credentials to rewrite history, turning trusted version tags into a silent distribution channel for malware and the attack loop started here.

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Trivy GitHub Action Hijacked to Steal CI/CD Secrets Attackers compromised two official GitHub Actions used by Trivy, force-pushing malicious commits to 75 version tags in aquasecurity/trivy-action and seven tags in aquasecurity/setup-trivy. This was the initial breach that later cascaded into the LiteLLM backdoor and npm worm campaign. The Attack: Attacker had valid credentials with tag-write privileges. Force-pushed malicious code to existing version tags—no new releases, no branches. Trusted tags became malware distribution channels. The Payload: TeamPCP Cloud Stealer Harvests SSH keys, cloud creds, DB strings, Kubernetes tokens, crypto wallets from runner memory and filesystem. Encrypts stolen data. Exfiltrates to scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org. The Cascade: Stolen credentials from this breach were used to backdoor LiteLLM on PyPI and compromise npm packages with a self-propagating worm. Each compromise harvested more credentials, feeding the next. What to Do: Rotate all CI/CD secrets immediately. Block scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org and IP 45.148.10[.]212. Check GitHub for repos named tpcp-docs (fallback exfiltration indicator). Pin GitHub Actions to full SHA hashes, not version tags. This breach started the loop: Trivy → credentials stolen → LiteLLM, npm compromised → more credentials stolen. Secure your pipeline before it becomes the next link.

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Quem escaneia os scanners? Trivy ecosystem supply chain temporarily compromised Criticalitaysk published GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 last week github.com/aquasecurity/triv…

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